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In recent years, Jonas Tallberg has published a number of notable articles on ‘‘the
power of the chair’’ in multilateral negotiations, looking in particular at the rotating
presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) (see, for example, Tallberg
2003, 2004). In a field that has traditionally been dominated by political practi-
tioners and game theorists, Tallberg has developed an original perspective that
draws on institutionalist approaches in political science. Most notably, whereas the
dominant approaches tend to model negotiations as bargains between actors with
comparable sets of resources under basic rules of exchange, Tallberg highlights how
negotiations are actually meshed within a complex political context in which ne-
gotiation failure is rife and in which, hence, a demand for leadership emerges.
Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union presents a comprehensive the-
oretical framework for analyzing leadership in multilateral negotiations. It then
applies this framework in six case studies that analyze the role of recent EU presi-
dencies on selected dossiers. Finally, the book assesses the generalizability of the
findings to international negotiations beyond the EU. Tallberg’s central theoretical
claims are organized around the distinction between the demand for and the sup-
ply of leadership in international negotiations. With respect to the demand for
leadership, he submits that it responds to the functional need to overcome the
collective-action problems endemic in negotiations. With respect to the supply of
leadership, Tallberg’s key claim is that formal leaders in international negotiations
enjoy distinctive informational and procedural powers that they can use, not only to
further the successful outcome of the negotiations, but also to skew this outcome to
fit their own preferences.
In a historical chapter, Tallberg traces how European cooperation over time has
given rise to ever more extensive demands for leadership. Initially, the European
Commission was regarded as the institution best positioned to meet these demands.
Over time, however, the expansion and institutionalization of the EU presidency
has made it the premier source of leadership in the Union. The crucial turning
point appears to lie around 1970, and Tallberg highlights two factors to account for
this turn. First, on the supply-side, the Commission discredited itself by overplaying
its hand in its relations with the member states. The Commission’s weakness be-
came particularly apparent in the ‘‘empty chair crisis’’ of 1965–1966. Second, on
the demand-side, the proliferation of European cooperation required coordination
by an actor who was well versed in the intricacies of intrastate policy coordination.
As European cooperation moved into new spheres beyond its initial economic
orientation, new forums (such as European Political Cooperation and the European
Council) emerged that bypassed the Commission and in which leadership naturally
fell to the EU presidency-in-office.
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The main body of Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union is made up of
six case studies, which are taken from the EU presidencies in the period 1999–
2003. These case studies are organized around the three functions that Tallberg
ascribes to the chair: managing the agenda of negotiations, brokering agreements,
and representing the member states collectively vis-a`-vis third parties. The case
studies nicely illustrate how EU member states have used the power of the chair to
put new issues on the EU agenda (Finland’s ‘‘Northern Dimension’’ initiative), to
exclude issues from the agenda (Germany on the car recycling directive), to broker
agreements to suit their own particular interests (Germany on the Agenda 2000
Financial Arrangements and France with the Treaty of Nice), to exploit their rep-
resentative function as a lever over the other member states (Sweden on the EU
transparency rules), and to further their own foreign policy interests (Denmark in
concluding the 2004 enlargement negotiations).
In a penultimate chapter Tallberg moves beyond the EU to review how other
international negotiation arenas (the Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organ-
ization, and international climate negotiations) have handled the question of lead-
ership. This comparative analysis demonstrates the value of Tallberg’s theoretical
framework beyond the EU. It also lends more general support to his claims that the
assignment of leadership in international negotiations follows functional needs and
that the chair performs important roles in furthering successful international
agreements.
The primary merit of Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union is that it
provides a comprehensive conceptual toolbox for analyzing the powers of chairs in
multilateral negotiations and for tracing the effects of their interventions. Tallberg
systematically lays out how functional needs related to agenda management,
brokerage, and representation inform the establishment of formal leaders in mul-
tilateral negotiations with privileged powers over information and procedures. He
then shows how these powers can be employed to further agreements and to dis-
tribute spoils.
Empirically, Tallberg convincingly demonstrates that member states holding the
EU presidency should not be regarded as mere humble servants of the collective
interest. In fact, wherever they discern a distinctive national interest, they are liable
to exploit the powers entrusted to them over the whole range of the decision-
making process to steer the outcome toward their desired direction. What is more,
the conditions of EU decision making allow such partisan interventions, even when
widely noted, to be successful, and thus they allow the presidency to leave its mark
on the policies produced.
Although this distributional point is well demonstrated, the evidence that the
presidency also makes negotiations more successful remains less striking. Tallberg’s
rationalist institutionalist theory suggests that the member states have opted for the
rotating presidency as the least dangerous leadership arrangement. They prefer
the diffuse benefits that come from taking turns in exploiting the privileges of the
presidency over putting their trust in a supranational institution (or an elected
chair, for that matter). One may well wonder whether this assessment can be jus-
tified in terms of efficiency. In fact, the idea of diffuse benefits may well be read as
the systematic institutionalization of pork-barrel politics. Each member state takes
its turn at the European trough, to the eventual detriment of collective European
interests. Strikingly, the comparison with other international arrangements shows
that alternative arrangements allow far less opportunities for the chair to appro-
priate the distributive spoils. In the end, one is left to wonder what masochistic
inclination has led the EU member states to oppose supranational or elective lead-
ership arrangements.
More generally, Tallberg’s conception of negotiation efficiency remains under-
elaborated. The concept plays a crucial role in his account of both the demand and
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the supply of leadership. In the theoretical chapter, Tallberg, following the earlier
negotiations literature (Schelling 1960; Raiffa 1982), invokes the notion of Pareto-
efficiency, which requires that none of the parties involved finds that its interests are
set back as a consequence of the negotiations. However, nowhere in the empirical
chapters is this test of Pareto-optimality brought to bear upon the evidence. In fact,
Tallberg’s emphasis on distributional interventions would suggest that some parties
actually stand to loose due to the presidency’s strategies. In particular, it is hard to
see how the presidency can push its own interests without any other country being
set back when the issues involve very limited positive benefitsFas in debates over
financial burdens (Germany in the Agenda 2000 negotiations), voting shares
(France in the Treaty of Nice negotiations), or even adding a new policy line (Fin-
land on the ‘‘Northern dimension’’). Rather than employing an independent
measure of what makes an agreement efficient, Tallberg seems to reduce efficiency
to the mere acquiescence of all states in the eventual agreement.
The under-elaboration of the concept of negotiation efficiency also precludes a
more differentiated treatment of the demand for leadership in the EU. In par-
ticular, it makes it impossible to explain why different leadership arrangements are
chosen under different conditions. Tallberg’s focus on the rise of the EU presidency
downplays the fact that the European Commission has also played important lead-
ership roles since the 1970s. For instance, the Commission has taken the lead in the
single European market initiative, in monetary integration, and in international
environmental negotiations. Moreover, in recent years the EU presidency has seen
new leadership arrangements emerge on its side. For example, the office of the
High Representative has taken over part of the presidency’s leadership tasks with
respect to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. On the other hand, the
informal Euro Council now has an elected chair. Tallberg’s theoretical framework
falls short of specifying the conditions under which these different leadership ar-
rangements might be preferred.
Leadership and Negotiations in the European Union brings the debate on the nature
of multilateral negotiations forward by advocating and systematically developing
some outspoken and appealing propositions regarding the demand for and supply
of leadership. At the same time, given the very strict structure of Tallberg’s argu-
ment, most of the evidence is adduced to support his main theses; comparatively
little space is left for considering rival accounts, likely challenges, or possible quali-
fications. These limitations are anything but insurmountable. Indeed, Tallberg’s
innovative institutionalist framework and his appealing case studies provide an
invigorating invitation for scholars to examine additional cases and to further
elaborate and refine the theory of leadership in multilateral negotiations.
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